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Hidden	from	public	view,	directors’	pay	in	Malaysia
leads	to	inefficiency	and	inequality
Ownership	and	control	of	business	corporations	by	state	or	government	is	common	in	Asian	economies.	Whether
this	is	a	better	governance	practice	than	the	market-based	model	of	developed	economies	remains	a	subject	of
intellectual	discourse.	Although	studies	on	corporate	governance	question	the	efficiency	of	state	ownership	and
control	of	business	entities	(Shleifer	and	Vishny,	1997),	the	efficiency	of	remuneration	practices	at	the	upper
echelons	of	these	entities	is	a	matter	of	public	interest.
Malaysia’s	1MDB	has	emerged	as	a	popularly	cited	case	globally	in	which	a	government-linked	business
corporation	had	allegedly	failed	to	perform	according	to	stakeholder	expectations.	As	recently	reported,	the	former
prime	minister	was	found	guilty	of	abuse	of	power,	criminal	breach	of	trust	and	money	laundering	in	relation	to
funds	belonging	to	SRC	International	Sdn	Bhd	(an	entity	previously	set	up	by	1MDB).	Together	with	other	scandals,
confidence	in	the	performance	of	government-linked	boards	of	directors	has	worsened	and	questions	were	raised
about	their	remuneration	practices.
It	has	been	widely	acknowledged	that	a	remuneration	scheme	can	be	abused	to	extract	rents	(inefficient	or
excessive	pay),	becoming	a	source	of	agency	problem	(Bebchuk	and	Fried,	2003).	Building	on	the	‘inefficient	pay
hypothesis’	introduced	in	our	previous	study,	we	argue	that	the	tendency	for	inefficient	pay	is	greater	if	government-
linked	corporations	are	managed	by	self-interested	agents,	while	monitoring	by	the	ultimate	stakeholder	(the	public)
is	lacking	due	to	factors	such	as	coordination	or	‘capture’	problems	amongst	diverse	stakeholder	groups,
inadequate	disclosure	and	the	sheer	complexity	of	pay	structures.
We	contribute	a	critical	insight	by	drawing	from	an	examination	of	the	disclosures	and	levels	of	directors’
remuneration	in	a	sample	of	Malaysia’s	government-linked	entities	(GLEs)	during	the	2013-2017	period.	For	public
readership,	the	findings	were	reported	in	our	recent	book.
Our	study	reveals	that	not	all	GLEs	have	achieved	satisfactory	levels	of	disclosure	for	their	directors’	pay	because
not	all	of	them	are	subject	to	disclosure	requirements.	Although	the	top	10	constituents	of	the	FTSE	Bursa	Malaysia
KLCI	(FBMKLCI)	are	significantly	occupied	by	government-linked	entities	(FTSE	Russell,	2018),	many	GLEs	are
not	publicly	listed	companies,	hence	not	regulated	by	stringent	pay	disclosure	rules.	For	example,	the	remuneration
of	individuals	that	served	on	the	boards	of	1MDB,	SRC	and	two	other	strategically	important	GLEs	(Khazanah
Nasional	Berhad	and	Permodalan	Nasional	Berhad)	were	hidden	from	public	view.	In	other	cases	where	disclosure
was	required,	salaries	and	bonuses	of	individual	executive	directors	were	disclosed,	but	values	of	long-term
incentive	plan	(e.g.,	stock	options),	pension	benefits,	and	other	perks	were	largely	opaque	in	selected	cases.
LSE Business Review: Hidden from public view, directors’ pay in Malaysia leads to inefficiency and inequality Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2020-10-01
Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/10/01/hidden-from-public-view-directors-pay-in-malaysia-leads-to-inefficiency-and-inequality/
Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
In	terms	of	stock	options,	we	illustrated	a	case	where	profits	that	were	cashed	out	from	exercising	the	options	as
well	as	the	subsequent	units	sold	were	not	disclosed,	and	the	value	of	options	held	(unexercised)	during	the	year
was	also	hidden.	By	implication,	the	monetary	value	of	this	pay	component	is	unknown.	Information,	at	best,	was
either	not	disclosed	in	easy-to-access	format	or	was	incomprehensible	to	the	public	at	large.	Inadequate	disclosure
means	that	the	total	fair	value	of	the	pay	package	for	the	executive	director	in	question	is	hidden	from	public	view.
Non-disclosure	or	inadequate	disclosure	of	information	has	somewhat	constrained	public	activism	and	scrutiny	over
directors’	pay	in	GLEs.	To	our	knowledge,	our	research	in	collaboration	with	the	Consumers	Association	of	Penang
(CAP)	stands	out	as	a	visible	public	spirited	stakeholder	activism	in	this	area	so	far,	which	requires	some	technical
knowledge	on	complex	remuneration	components.	Our	proposal	for	rigorous	pay	disclosure	regulation	stands,	even
though	the	previous	government’s	plan	to	issue	a	guideline	on	directors’	pay	by	the	end	of	last	year	has	not
materialised.
Following	the	change	in	government	early	this	year,	directors’	pay	is	under	renewed	scrutiny	together	with	the
public	outcry	against	several	appointments	of	Members	of	Parliament	(MPs)	to	the	helms	of	government-linked
entities.	Concern	was	raised	whether	such	appointments	were	actually	associated	with	high	salaries	and
allowances.	This	issue	was	debated	in	Parliament	recently.	We	argue	that	greater	disclosure	will	enlighten	the
public	and	inspire	more	informed	debate	and	activism	for	policy	implications	in	the	public	interest.
Based	on	a	sample	of	limited	disclosure,	we	find	that	the	average	individual	pay	disclosed	for	49	GLE	executive
directors	(including	CEOs)	had	approximately	increased	from	RM3.401	million	in	2013	to	RM3.701	million	in	2017.
Each	executive	took	home	an	average	of	RM283,417	and	RM308,417	monthly	in	2013	and	2017,	respectively.
Although	this	figure	may	still	be	underestimated	(i.e.,	due	to	inadequate	or	non-disclosure	items),	it	is	certainly	not	a
‘humble’	amount	to	begin	with	for	these	elites.	Given	a	statutory	minimum	monthly	wage,	the	average	pay	of
government-linked	entities’	executive	directors	is	more	than	300	times	the	minimum	wage	of	employees.	This	is
shown	in	Table	1.
Table	1.	Top-bottom	pay	gap
Taking	the	UK	as	a	simple	comparison,	the	pay	gap	between	CEOs	of	FTSE	100	companies	and	their	employees
was	not	as	wide,	albeit	not	immune	from	scrutiny	(Chartered	Institute	of	Personnel	and	Development,	2018).	FTSE
100	companies	are	distinguishable	from	Malaysia’s	GLEs	as	they	operate	in	a	more	competitive	market-based
system	where	stakeholders	are	relatively	sophisticated	and	facilitated	by	a	rigorous	disclosure	regulation	on
directors’	remuneration	[refer	to	Section	420(1)	of	the	Companies	Act	2006].	As	a	result,	the	pay	gap	between
executive	directors	and	employees	in	the	UK	are	gradually	being	‘humbled’	by	market	forces	as	well	as	scrutiny
from	civil	society.
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Although	the	complete	picture	of	directors’	pay	in	GLEs	remains	hidden,	our	findings	prudently	reveal	a	wide	pay
gap	between	the	top	and	bottom	strata	of	society	in	Malaysia.	In	any	case,	rewarding	a	mediocre	performance	with
an	extravagant	pay	is	a	source	of	inefficiency,	which	must	be	curtailed	in	tackling	the	gap	between	rich	and	poor.
Learning	from	the	UK,	we	call	for	rigorous	pay	disclosure	regulation	and	active	monitoring	of	directors’	pay	in
Malaysia’s	GLEs.	In	our	opinion,	this	public	interest	proposal	will	gain	support	from	a	responsible	government	to
achieve	its	Shared	Prosperity	Vision	2030.
In	the	meantime,	the	financial	and	economic	implications	of	COVID-19	have	inspired	our	proposal	for	corporate
elites	globally	to	forgo	what	is	seen	as	excessive	pay	at	the	upper	echelons	of	society.	What	are	deemed	as
excessive	amounts	can	be	transferred	to	compensate	employees	who	have	lost	jobs	and	suffered	the	coronavirus
implications	colossally.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	book	titled	‘How	Much	Is	Hidden?	Pay	for	Elites	in	Government-Linked
Entities’.	
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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